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Abstract:
The main objective of this paper is to fi ll a critical gap in the literature by analyzing the effects 
of decentralization on the macroeconomic stability. A survey of the voluminous literature 
on decentralization suggests that the question of the links between decentralization and 
macroeconomic stability has been relatively scantily analyzed. Even though there is still a lot of 
room for analysis as far as the effects of decentralization on other aspects of the economy are 
concerned, we believe that it is in this area that a more thorough analyses are mostly called 
for. Through this paper, we will try to shed more light on the issue notably by looking at other 
dimension of macroeconomic stability than the ones usually employed in previous studies as well 
as by examining other factors that might accentuate or diminish the effects of decentralization on 
macroeconomic stability. Our results found that decentralization appears to lead to a decrease in 
infl ation rate. However, we do not fi nd any correlation between decentralization with the level of 
fi scal defi cit. Our results also show that the impact of decentralization on infl ation is conditional on 
the level of perceived corruption and political institutions.
Keywords: decentralization, macroeconomic stability, fi scal federalism, institutional and political 
environment
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1. Introduction
The wave of decentralization process has taken into the world since the last two decades. 
Even though the debates on the benefi ts of decentralization are yet to be conclusive, as 
witnessed by the huge literature on this area, it has not stopped various countries from 
proceeding with the decentralization of their economies. While it cannot be denied that 
there are countries which have benefi ted from this process, there are also those whose 
experiments with decentralization have turned sour. 
One area in which studies have been scant is the effects of decentralization on 
macroeconomic stability. It is also interesting to note that the question of macroeconomic 
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stability itself has been exiguously analyzed in the literature. 1 Macroeconomic instability 
is usually understood as a situation of economic malaise where the economy does not 
seem to have settled in a steady position and where, eventually, something needs to be 
done for putting it back on track (Azam, 2001). To put it differently, macroeconomic 
instability refers to phenomena that make the domestic macroeconomic environment 
less predictable and it can take the form of volatility of key macroeconomic variables 
or of unsustainability in their behaviour. As decentralization implies that more fi scal 
powers as well as responsibilities will be devolved to subnational governments, the 
federal government may lose some of its control on the macroeconomic environment 
of the country. And depending on the behaviour of the subnational governments as 
well as the level of infl uence that can be exerted by the federal government on the 
subnational governments, the macroeconomic conditions of the country will be more 
or less volatile. In other words, the question of the effect of fi scal decentralization on 
macroeconomic instability is very much empirical in nature and may vary according 
to the institutional and political structure of the country in question. 
It is thus the aim of this paper to shed more light on this link between decentralization 
and macroeconomic instability. The paper starts by reviewing the literature to show 
that there is yet to be a consensus both at the theoretical and empirical level, among 
economists as far as the effects of decentralization on macroeconomic instability are 
concerned. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology employed. The results of 
our econometric estimations are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2.  The Relationship between Macroeconomic Stability and Decentralization
There are two contrasting beliefs regarding the impact of fi scal decentralization on 
macroeconomic stability.2 The fi rst one holds the view that the two are negatively 
related. With fi scal decentralization, subnational governments are granted more power 
in determining the level of their expenses as well as their revenues resulting in the 
multiplicity of political and budget centres. This in turn will make the fi scal management 
system become more complicated especially the oversight system which is crucial for 
instilling effi cient budget management. In addition to this, subnational governments 
usually have their own agendas to pursue that may be different from the ones pursued 
by the federal government thus leading to a coordination problem. Furthermore, there
1 As it is put by Satyanath & Subramaniam (2004), “It is surprising that while so much of the recent 
literature has been devoted to, even obsessed with, explaining the cross-country variation in real 
variables—for example, in income…there has been much less of a concern with analyzing the 
cross-country variation in nominal or macroeconomic instability. This is despite the fact that the 
cross-country variation in nominal or macroeconomic instability is even more astounding than that 
in income.” (Satyanath & Subramaniam, 2004: p. 2).
2 It should be noted that no theoretical framework has been developed in order to show the link 
between the two variables.
DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.416
152      PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 2, 2012
is also the problem of soft budget constraint3 that underlies the tendency of fi scal 
profl igacy among subnational governments. The increase in autonomy accorded to 
lower level governments may increase the incentives for opportunistic behaviour 
among them which may then try to shift their expenditure burdens onto the nation as 
a whole. Under these circumstances, the coordination of national fi scal and monetary 
policies as adjustment tools is complicated, posing a challenge to national economic 
stability (Prud’homme, 1995). 
On the other hand, under the logic of commitment problem, decentralization is 
associated with more price and macro stability. In the literature, high infl ation is 
attributed to the inability of policymakers to commit credibly to monetary restraint 
which in turn is due to the fact that high infl ation, regardless of its costs, is their 
dominant strategy (Barro, Gordon, 1983; Kydland, Presscott, 1977). However, fi scal 
decentralization through partial devolution of control over spending and monetary 
policy to lower levels of governments may make it more diffi cult for policymakers to 
renege on their commitment for price stability. Furthermore, the competition among 
lower levels of governments for investments may reduce their incentives to renege on 
stable monetary policy (Qian, Rolland, 1998). 
Another theory suggests that as fi scal decentralization leads to a clear revenue sharing 
mechanism between state and federal government, there will be less competition for 
fi scal resources among them. And this will have a positive impact on macroeconomic 
stability because fi scal competition among different levels of government has been 
shown to undermine national fi scal policy objectives, particularly by promoting 
pro-cyclical fi scal policy (Thornton, 2007). 
The positive effect of fi scal decentralization on price stability can also take place through 
the effect that fi scal decentralization has on the independence of central bank. Shah (2005) 
argued that with fi scal decentralization the central bank will be more independent since 
a decentralized system would require a more clarifi ed rules and regulations under which 
a central bank operates as well as its functions and its relationships with different level 
of governments. Lohmann (1998) argued that Germany’s low infl ation in the post-war 
can be partly attributed to the independence of the Bundesbank which was enhanced by 
the way it was embedded into the country’s federal institutions. According to the author, 
a majority of the bank’s council members were appointed by the Lander governments. 
The Landers were also represented in the Bundesrast which could veto changes to central 
bank legislation. All those factors serve as checks and balances on the attempts by the 
central government to infl ate the economy in order to gain popularity during elections.
On the empirical grounds, there have been very few studies that analyze the effects 
of decentralization on macroeconomic stability and almost all of them used the 
3 The soft-budget constraint problem refers to the fact that federal transfers to subnational 
governments are based on ex post fi nancial needs and not, as it should be, on ex-ante characteristics 
of the recipient states. As such, subnational governments are not held to a fi xed budget but fi nd their 
budget constraint softened by the injection of additional credit (or guarantees) whenever they are on 
the verge of fi scal fi asco. See Rodden (2005) for further explanation of the issue.
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infl ation rate as their indicator for macroeconomic instability. King and Ma (2001) 
found a signifi cant positive correlation between centralization and infl ation when they 
omitted from their sample “high-infl ation” countries defi ned here as those having an 
average infl ation of more than 20 %. They also found that the inclusion of centralization 
in their regression gives central bank independence the right sign. The paper was 
later reinvestigated by Neyapti (2003) who took both local accountability, as a fi scal 
disciplinary device and central bank independence, as a proxy for monetary discipline, 
into account to assess the relationship between decentralization and infl ation. His 
empirical investigation demonstrates that, controlling for business cycles, openness and 
government size, revenue decentralization has signifi cant negative effect on infl ation only 
in low infl ation countries. These results are consistent with King and Ma’s observation 
of the signifi cant effect of central bank independence. Neyapti observed, however, that 
decentralization has a signifi cant negative effect on infl ation also in higher infl ation 
countries when coupled with both central bank independence and local accountability. 
More recently, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2005) found that decentralization appears 
to promote price stability. Their results are consistent both in the full and sub-sample of 
developed, developing and transitional countries. This suggests according to the authors 
that their results are not dependant on the level of development. 
Treisman (2000) found that fi scal decentralization have no signifi cant correlation with 
infl ation. The author used three indictors of decentralization, namely, whether the 
country is classifi ed as federal according to Elzaar (1985), the share of subnational 
spending of the total government spending and the share of subnational revenue of 
the total government revenue. The results were confi rmed by Rodden and Wibbels 
(2002). The authors found that although there is a positive correlation between fi scal 
decentralization and infl ation, the relation does not achieve statistical signifi cance. 
Thornton (2007) found that the impact of revenue decentralization on infl ation is not 
statistically signifi cant. According to Thornton, these results suggest that countries that 
shift a large share of revenues to sub-national governments are able to pursue better 
policies at the national level and not a refl ection of relatively more responsible fi scal 
policies at the level of sub-national governments. 
Based on the literature review above, it is quite obvious to see that there are still lots 
to be done as far as the links between decentralization and macroeconomic stability 
are concerned. Not only that the studies have failed to acknowledge other aspects of 
macroeconomic stability, they seemed to ignore various other factors that could infl uence 
directly or indirectly the effects of decentralization on macroeconomic stability. One 
type of variables that we believe to be rather important is the ones that capture the 
existing institutional and political arrangements of the country in question such as the 
quality of the government, democracy, political stability or the level of corruption. As 
shown by our review of literature in the preceding section, these variables have been 
widely studied notably from the angle of the impact that decentralization may have 
on them. However, there are yet any studies that try to examine the impact that these 
variables may have on the impact of decentralization on macroeconomic stability. It is 
not too farfetched to assume for example that the impact of a decentralization process 
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on macroeconomic stability will in a way depend on the position of the country in 
question in the governance index level. These institutional variables may be introduced 
into the framework either directly or indirectly through their interaction with other more 
traditional independent variables. Such interactions may have been widely covered in 
other studies of decentralization but they are yet to be introduced into the regressions 
between decentralization and macroeconomic stability.
3.  Data Description and Econometric Estimation
3.1  Data description
Our data covers 62 countries from the period of 1972 to 2001. This data set is 
structured as a panel with observations for each country consisting of fi ve-year 
averages. Each country has six observations: 1972-1976, 1977-1981, 1982-1986, 
1986-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001. The panel is, however, not balanced because some 
observations are missing for a number of countries. Table 1 below summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of the variables. Data related to decentralization are obtained 
from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) which are collected and published by 
the International Monetary Fund. More precisely the following indicators will be used 
as our measure of decentralization
– the percentage of subnational governments expenditure of the total government 
expenditures
– the percentage of subnational governments revenues of the total government revenues.
The usage of GFS data to measure the extent of decentralization has been widely 
criticized in the literature.4 This has led to the use of other type of indicators as well 
as to the construction of new database by some authors. However compelling the use 
of these data may be, it will not serve our purpose here as they are only available for 
certain developed countries. In this study we will use two variables as our measure of 
macroeconomic instability namely (1) the infl ation rate and (2) the level of fi scal defi cit.
We have introduced in our estimation the institutional and political setting of a country 
using the indicators provided by the Center for International Development and Confl ict 
Management under their Polity IV Project.5 As our measure of corruption, we use the 
4 See for example Ebel and Yilmaz (2000).
5 The Polity IV data set contains coded annual information on regime and authority characteristics for 
all independent states in the global state system and covers the years 1800-2004. We will also use 
the data published by the Freedom House. The latter has over the last 35 years conducted surveys 
in more than 193 countries and each country was assigned two numerical ratings, one for political 
rights and one for civil liberties. Each of this rating is based on a 1 to 7 scale. Until 2003, countries 
whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and for Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 
were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 “Partly Free," and between 5.5 and 7.0 “Not Free.” 
Beginning with the ratings for 2003, countries whose combined average ratings fall between 3.0 and 
5.0 are "Partly Free, and those between 5.5 and 7.0 are "Not Free."
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Transparency International historical corruption index.6 We have also included an 
indicator of trade openness measured as the percentage of total trade to GDP to control 
for the impact of openness on price levels as well as the rate of infl ation as argued by 
Romer (1993) and Rogoff (2003). 
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
Infl ation 287 0.85 0.23 -0.52 3.56
Defi cit 288 -3039.67 15395.99 -110922.4 81383.6
Expenditure 
decentralization 261 26.286 17.0294 1.45 75.74
Revenue 
decentralization
252 19.04 15.30 0.62 76.40
GDP 287 9927.86 9234.27 137.54 41559.24
M2 210 61.53 212.34 1.53 1852.05
Population 312 6.55e+07 1.85e+08 164949.6 1.25e+09
Openness 287 68.16 42.48 8.68 258.47
Central bank 
independence 131 0.46 0.19 0.17 0.89
Corruption 186 6.08 2.44 0.2 9.80
Democracy 265 5.35 7.62 -52.8 10
Executive 
constraints 265 4.27 6.64 -52.4 7
Polity 265 3.54 9.42 -56.8 10
Political rights 303 2.67 2.02 -1.8 7
Government size 277 57353.82 123153.3 0 862603.4
3.2 Econometric specifi cation
Using the data described above, we estimate the following model
 1 2it it it it itMS FD Pol Z u        (1)
where MSit is the measure of macrostability represented here by the infl ation rate and 
the fi scal defi cit. Following Neyapti (2003), we use a linear transformation of the rate
6 This historical data on the degree to which business transactions involve corruption are reported 
by the Center of Corruption Research at the University of Groningen jointly with Transparency 
International. The index is calculated as averages of corruption rankings from Business 
International, Political Risk Services, World Competitiveness Report, and Political & Economic 
Risk Consultancy. The index ranges from 0 to 10 with 10 indicating least corruption.
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of infl ation that scales it down to the range between zero and one. The formula used for 
the linear transformation is as follows:
 Inf = [infl ation rate/1+infl ation rate] (2)
The transformation will allow us to control for the large variance in infl ation across 
countries and over time. FDit is the measure of fi scal decentralization, Polit denotes 
a measure of political institutions which will be represented by four variables: the level 
of political rights, the democracy level, the policy and the constraint on executive. 
The Zit matrix comprises of several control regressor (M2 as a percentage of GDP, 
the index of central bank independence, the per capita GDP, the total population, the 
government size, the openness to international trade and the level of corruption). And 
fi nally uit is the error term. 
We start by testing for the presence of endogeneity problem in our estimation. In the 
case of our main independent variables, the results show that we fail to reject the 
exogeneity of the fi scal decentralization with respect to all our dependant variables. We 
also fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of several of our control variables 
namely the GDP per capita, the M2 and the openness variable. 
We then examine whether a fi xed or a random effect model is more appropriate for the 
estimation of Equation 1.7 The test for both the rate of infl ation and the fi scal defi cit are 
in favour of a random effect specifi cation. Consequently, we used the random effect 
model in estimating our model.
4.  Estimation Results
4.1  Baseline regressions 
The results of our baseline estimations are presented in Table 2 to Table 4. In Table 2, 
the dependant variable is the infl ation rate and fi scal decentralization is measured as 
the proportion of subnational expenditures to total expenditures. In column A (Table 
2), we estimate our regressions without controlling for corruption and political 
institutions. The results show that there is no signifi cant relationship between infl ation 
and decentralization. Infl ation rate appears not to be infl uenced by decentralization. 
In column B (Table 2), we introduce in our regression a variable representing the 
level of corruption. It is quite striking to see that once we control for corruption, 
the rate of infl ation becomes signifi cantly correlated with the level of expenditure 
decentralization. The estimated coeffi cient for expenditure decentralization is found 
7 The null hypothesis of the Haussman (1978) test is that, assuming that both OLS and GLS are 
consistent, OLS is ineffi cient, the alternative being OLS is consistent but GLS is not. In other words, 
the Haussman statistic tests for the correlation between the individual effects and explanatory 
variables. Rejection of the null hypothesis thus leads to the rejection of random effects model, in 
favour of fi xed effects (see Hsiao, 1986 or Baltagi, 1995). 
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to be signifi cant at the 1% level. The results suggest that in contrary to popular belief 
of a negative effect of decentralization on macrostability, an increase in expenditure 
decentralization, all else being equal, would lead to a decrease in the infl ation rate. 
As for the level of corruption, it is also found to be highly correlated with the rate of 
infl ation. An increase in the level of perceived corruption will lead to an increase in 
the level of infl ation.
These results are suggestive to the importance of taking into account institutional and 
political settings in assessing the impact of decentralization. In order to further verify 
this, we include in our regressions several other variables that are supposed to capture 
the institutional and political context of a country. The results are reported in column C 
to F (Table 2). However, as we can see from Table 2, none of these four variables appear 
to have a signifi cant relationship with the rate of infl ation. Nevertheless, the inclusion 
of these political variables does not alter the correlation between decentralization and 
infl ation. The latter remains negatively correlated with decentralization. 
As for other control variables, M2 are found to be signifi cantly related to the rate of 
infl ation. The latter is found to be positively related to M2. And once we control for 
political and institutional variables (column B to F, Table 2), a negative and signifi cant 
correlation is found between the rate of infl ation and the GDP per capita. An increase 
in the level of GDP is thus associated with a decrease in the level of infl ation. The 
results are similar to the one found in other studies (Neyapti 2003; Martinez-Vazquez 
& McNab, 2005; Thornton, 2007). 
In Table 3, we replace our measure of fi scal decentralization with that of the proportion 
of subnational revenue of the total revenue. Our results are somehow similar to the 
ones found previously. However, in contrary to expenditure decentralization, revenue 
decentralization appears to be negatively correlated with the infl ation rate even if we 
do not control for corruption or political institutions. Nevertheless when we introduce 
corruption and political institutions in our estimations, the statistical signifi cance of the 
coeffi cient for decentralization has improved. 
Our second measure of macrostability is the defi cit level. The results as reported in Table 
4 and 5 show that there is no correlation between the defi cit level and decentralization. 
Even after controlling for political variables, there appears to be no correlation between 
these two variables. Our results are somehow in contrast to the ones by Neyapti (2006) 
who found decentralization to have a negative impact on defi cit. Our results also point 
to a negative correlation between the government size and the defi cit level which is 
quite surprising as it signifi es that a bigger government will lead to less defi cit.
4.2  The indirect effects of corruption and political institutions
In previous section, we have seen that our measure of macrostability can be infl uenced 
by the level of perceived corruption or by political institutions. It is thus interesting 
to see if in addition to these direct effects, these same variables will also have an 
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impact on the effect of decentralization on macrostability. It seems natural to argue that 
a positive effect of decentralization on macrostability will somehow be attenuated if the 
country is plagued with a serious problem of corruption. In contrary, a country which 
is free from corruption will be able to fully benefi t from the effects of decentralization 
on macrostability. It can also be argued that a more stable political environment may 
accentuate the impact of decentralization on macrostability and vice versa.
In order to test for the assumptions of an indirect effect of corruption and political 
institutions on macrostability, we introduce in our equation the interaction term 
between these variables with our measure of decentralization. The results for each 
indicator of macrostability are reported in Table 6.
In column A (Table 6), the dependant variable is the infl ation rate while decentralization 
is measured by the proportion of subnational governments’ expenditure to total 
government, expenditure. The results of the estimation show that decentralization 
has a negative impact on the level of infl ation. But none of the coeffi cients estimates 
of the interaction term are statistically signifi cant which signifi es that the impact of 
expenditure decentralization on infl ation is not infl uenced by corruption and political 
institutions. It is noteworthy that even after controlling for the level of perceived 
corruption has a direct positive impact on the level of infl ation.
In column B (Table 6), we use revenue decentralization as our measure of decentralization. 
We note that the impact of decentralization on level of infl ation appears to be attenuated 
by the level of perceived corruption. The parameter estimates for the interaction term 
between decentralization and corruption is statistically signifi cant. Note that the level of 
corruption no longer has a direct impact on infl ation. The coeffi cient for corruption is 
no longer statistically signifi cant. As for political institution, our results show that they 
do not have direct nor indirect effect on the level of infl ation.
In column C and D (Table 6), we use the defi cit level as our dependant variable. Similar 
to the results found previously, the level of defi cit is not infl uenced by decentralization. 
And the level of corruption as well as political institutions does not have any impact 
(directly or indirectly) on the level of defi cit.
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Table 2
Expenditure Decentralization and Infl ation Rate
A B C D E F
Decentrali- 
zation 
-0.0020 
(0.0021) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0070*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0063** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0063** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0064** 
(0.0031) 
Central bank 
independence
-0.0352 
(0.1356) 
-0.1171 
(0.1355) 
-0.2026 
(0.1432) 
-0.0621 
(0.1929) 
-0.0510 
(0.1945) 
-0.0657 
(0.1925) 
M2 0.0723*** 
(0.0203) 
0.0802*** 
(0.0221) 
0.0699*** 
(0.0225) 
0.1030*** 
(0.0252) 
0.1039*** 
(0.0249) 
0.1023*** 
(0.0254) 
GDP -0.0089 
(0.0270) 
-0.1123*** 
(0.0397)
-0.1089*** 
(0.0382) 
-0.1872*** 
(0.0554) 
-0.1933*** 
(0.0562) 
-0.1838*** 
(0.0550) 
Openness -0.0007 
(0.0007) 
-0.0004 
(0.0008) 
-0.0001 
(0.0007) 
-0.0000 
(0.0010) 
-0.0000 
(0.0010) 
-0.0000 
(0.0010) 
Population -0.0020 
(0.0198) 
0.0197 
(0.0206)  
0.0303 
(0.0214) 
0.0342 
(0.0305) 
0.0352 
(0.0311) 
0.0333 
(0.0303) 
Corruption -0.0777*** 
(0.0233) 
-0.0675*** 
(0.0231) 
-0.1312*** 
(0.0317) 
 -0.135*** 
(0.0321) 
-0.1291*** 
(0.0318) 
Political rights -.035347 
(0.0261) 
Democracy 0.0016 
(0.0029)
Polity 0.0014 
(0.0025)  
Executive 
contraints
0.0016 
(0.0032)  
Constant 0.8448* 
(0.4979) 
1.0559** 
(0.5099) 
1.0690** 
(0.4923) 
1.0359 
(0.7398) 
1.0460 
(0.7479) 
1.0413 
(0.7334) 
R2 0.3801 0.5046 0.5942 0.3278 0.3269 0.3291 
No. of 
observations 294 294 294 294 294 294
No. of 
countries 49 49 49 49 49 49
Notes: standard error in parentheses; signifi cant at 10% level*, signifi cant at 5% level**, signifi cant 
at 1% level**
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Table 3 
Revenue Decentralization and Infl ation Rate
A B C D E F
Decentralization
(revenue)
-0.0045* 
(0.0026)
-0.0069*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0081*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0088** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0089** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0088** 
(0.0038) 
Central bank 
independence
-0.0516 
(0.1358)
-0.0749 
(0.1380) 
-0.1491 
(0.1401) 
-0.0741 
(0.1926) 
-0.0673 
(0.1937) 
-0.076 
(0.1925) 
M2 0.0681*** 
(0.0201)
0.0892*** 
(0.0219) 
0.0777*** 
(0.0222) 
0.1058*** 
(0.0242) 
0.1061*** 
(0.0241) 
0.1054*** 
(0.0245) 
GDP 0.0059 
(0.0279)
-0.0924** 
(0.0426) 
-0.0772* 
(0.0396) 
-0.1631*** 
(0.0578) 
-0.1688*** 
(0.0586) 
-0.1594*** 
(0.0574) 
Openness -0.0008 
(0.0007) 
-0.0002 
(0.0008) 
0.0001 
(0.0008) 
0.0000 
(0.0010) 
0.0000 
(0.0010) 
0.0000 
(0.0010) 
Population 0.0058 
(0.0198) 
0.0262 
(0.0224) 
0.0342 
(0.0222) 
0.0452 
(0.0317) 
0.0464 
(0.0321) 
0.0438 
(0.0314) 
Corruption -0.0725*** 
(0.0228) 
-0.0551** 
(0.0228) 
-0.1272*** 
(0.0301) 
-0.1312*** 
(0.0305) 
-0.1246*** 
(0.0300) 
Political rights -0.0314 
(0.0259)  
Democracy 0.0019 
(0.0028) 
Polity 0.0016 
(0.0024) 
Executive 
contraints
0.0019 
(0.0031) 
Constant 0.6502 
(0.5093) 
0.7234 
(0.5656) 
0.6994 
(0.5269) 
0.6565 
(0.7854) 
0.6673 
(0.7909) 
0.6670 
(0.7793)  
R2 between 0.4031 0.4945 0.5833 0.3374 0.3404 0.3364 
No. of 
observations 294 294 294 294 294 294
No. of countries 49 49 49 49 49 49
Notes: standard error in parentheses; signifi cant at 10% level*, signifi cant at 5% level**, signifi cant 
at 1% level***.
DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.416
PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 2, 2012        161
Table 4 
Expenditure Decentralization and Defi cit
A B C D E F
Decentrali- 
zation
-249.5539 
(210.3611)
-45.9466 
(216.7521) 
7.6788 
(227.7219) 
-122.5515 
(220.7684)
-131.4853 
(220.4912) 
-114.6224 
(219.9376) 
Government 
size
-0.0670*** 
(0.0130)  
 -0.0622*** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0610*** 
(0.0135) 
-0.0413** 
(0.0202) 
-0.0422** 
(0.0202) 
-0.0407** 
(0.0202) 
GDP 22801.16*** 
(6636.693)  
19730.12*** 
(7208.145) 
19423.88*** 
(7232.238) 
14015.55* 
(7921.989) 
13835.79* 
(7906.534) 
14301.21* 
(7901.63) 
Openness -97.6126 
(77.7238)  
-47.5449 
(76.3210) 
-47.6396 
(76.464) 
9.3261 
(89.0054) 
13.15467 
(88.8271) 
4.6377 
(88.7444) 
Population -11894.04 
(9165.708) 
-20082.17 
(14006.72) 
-18892.26 
(14115.13) 
-20972.66 
(15239.68) 
-20516.86 
(15232.87) 
-21202.37 
(15190.46) 
Corruption 543.5021 
(1298.573)  
780.0778 
(1335.694) 
42.4183 
(1456.478) 
-67.1448 
(1456.135) 
134.6995 
(1447.768) 
Political rights 885.5985 
(1132.154) 
Democracy -8.4391 
(142.2871) 
Polity 55.8371 
(115.6731)  
Executive 
contraints
-111.757 
(164.1635) 
Constant 9679.554 
(135345.6) 
161516.9 
205175.4 
139397.8 
(207495.2) 
229442.4 
(239256.3) 
223910 
(239101.2) 
230605.8 
(238518.7)  
R2 between 0.1553 0.2435 0.2480 0.1240 0.1266 0.1291 
No. of 
observations 294 294 294 294 294 294
No. of 
countries 49 49 49 49 49 49
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Table 5 
Revenue Decentralization and Fiscal Defi cit
A B C D E F
Decentrali- 
zation
-192.3795 
(137.7678) 
-471.4344 
(389.9944) 
-468.6184 
(390.6733) 
-418.7051 
(392.284) 
-439.5725 
(391.2985) 
-392.293 
(391.6007) 
Government 
size
-0.0552*** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0638*** 
(0.0132) 
-0.0623*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0472** 
(0.0204) 
-0.0485** 
(0.0204) 
-0.0462** 
(0.0203) 
GDP 13257.67*** 
(4031.76) 
19930.49*** 
(7113.249) 
19434.69*** 
(7151.949)  
15111.64* 
(7864.256) 
15005.43* 
(7846.61) 
15318.68* 
(7848.482) 
Openness -29.6787 
(46.167) 
-47.1042 
(75.7441) 
-46.4211 
(75.8776)  
0.8634 
(88.4786) 
2.2704 
(88.2689) 
-4.8144 
(88.2783) 
Population -10747.18* 
(5496.96) 
-17430.28 
(13818.65) 
-15516.25 
(14045.13)  
-19394.46 
(15174.63) 
-18879.57 
(15161.37) 
-19726.99 
(15135.67) 
Corruption 749.133 
(1296.869) 
959.3556 
(1325.096)  
364.5793 
(1455.059) 
273.8363 
(1453.808) 
437.1089 
(1448.281) 
Political 
rights
862.5821 
(1072.218) 
Democracy 1.7443 
(141.9599)  
Polity 63.4994 
(115.2619)  
Executive 
contraints
-98.7543 
(164.1183) 
Constant 64781.99 
(80763.88) 
122287 
(203851) 
91371.24 
(207782.4) 
197243.9 
(240619.3)  
190185.6 
(240388.5) 
200597.2 
(240010.2) 
R2 0.2113 0.2537 0.2583 0.1331 0.1364 0.1371 
No. of 
observations 294 294 294 294 294 294
No. of 
countries 49 49 49 49 49 49
Notes: standard error in parentheses; signifi cant at 10% level*, signifi cant at 5% level**, signifi cant 
at 1% level***
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Table 6 
Indirect Effects of Corruption and Political Institutions
Infl ation Defi cit
A B E F
Decentralization 
(expenditure)
-0.0143** 
(0.0067) 
-44.0657 
(279.3191) 
Decentralization (revenue) -0.0243*** 
(0.0087)
-164.9142 
(255.2185) 
Central bank independence -0.0352 
(0.1980) 
-0.1276 
(0.1946) 
M2 0.1020*** 
(0.0250) 
0.0983*** 
(0.0237) 
GDP -0.2104*** 
(0.0578) 
-0.1629*** 
(0.0581) 
1148.653 
(1815.006) 
546.6188 
(1156.83) 
-0.0713*** 
(0.0091)  
-0.0303*** 
(0.0084) 
Openness -0.0001 
(0.0010) 
-0.0002 
(0.0010) 
-17.4974 
(41.2849) 
-2.6873 
(29.2362) 
Population 0.0324 
(0.0320) 
0.0372 
(0.0323) 
-1742.2 
(1191.689)
-1225.501 
(779.5313) 
Corruption -0.0889* 
(0.0465) 
-0.0581 
(0.0475) 
-127.8501 
(1286.163)
-603.8841 
(791.484) 
Democracy 0.0019 
(0.0068) 
-1.5947 
(369.4532)
347.5146 
(241.9974) 
Corruption*Dec -0.0014 
(0.0009) 
-0.0025** 
(0.0012) 
17.0136 
(39.0174) 
34.8798 
(31.8542) 
Demo*Dec -0.0000 
(0.0001) 
-0.0000 
(0.0001) 
3.1053 
(9.1577) 
-5.6113 
(7.7528) 
Constant 1.4690* 
(0.8220) 
1.2440 
(0.8373) 
17321.16 
(26545.97) 
15623.28 
(17641.03) 
R2 between 0.3490 0.3948 0.8045 0.4550
No. of observations 294 294 294 294
No. of countries 49 49 49 49
Notes: standard error in parentheses; signifi cant at 10% level*, signifi cant at 5% level**, signifi cant 
at 1% level***.
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5.  Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper is to fi ll a critical gap in the literature on the relationship 
between decentralization and macroeconomic stability. The empirical results provided 
in this study despite data inadequacies and methodological shortcoming, point to the 
fact that there is a negative relationship between certain variable of macrostability and 
decentralization. In our baseline estimations, we found that decentralization appears to 
lead to a decrease in infl ation rate. However, we do not fi nd any correlation between 
decentralization with the level of fi scal defi cit. The results suggest that decentralization 
is not disastrous for macroeconomic stability. In contrast, it has a negative impact on 
infl ation and does not deteriorate nor ameliorate the fi scal balance of a country. Our 
results seem to run counter to a rapidly growing popular belief that decentralization 
is disastrous to macroeconomic stability. Our results also show that the impact of 
decentralization on infl ation is conditional on the level of perceived corruption and 
political institutions. Together, these results indicate that the benefi t from fi scal 
decentralization can only be realized if a country possesses the right kind of political 
or institutional environment. 
Our fi ndings are in line with the views on the positive relationship between fi scal 
decentralization and macroeconomic stability discussed in the previous section. Indeed, 
all these views implicitly suggest that for fi scal decentralization to have a positive 
impact on macroeconomic stability, it would require the existence of a good political 
and institutional setting. For example, the argument made by Thorton (2000) that 
fi scal decentralization leads to a clear sharing mechanism of fi scal revenues between 
subnational governments and federal government and therefore less competition for 
fi scal resources between them may not be totally valid if the process took place in 
a country which is plagued with serious corruption problem or is run in an undemocratic 
manner. These results are also suggestive of the fact that the negative impacts of fi scal 
decentralization on macroeconomic stability as suggested in the literature review may 
not materialize if the country in question possess a sound institutional and political 
environment.
As for fi scal defi cit, our results seem to suggest that even though state governments 
may be subject to a soft budget constraint, the extent towards which this may be 
affecting the nation’s total fi scal defi cit is still small. In other words, the size of the 
subnational governments in proportion to the total size of the government is still small 
and the level of decentralization is still relatively minor therefore, the impact on the 
national fi scal balance may not be substantial. Further studies should thus look into the 
issue if there is any level beyond which fi scal decentralization starts to have an impact 
on fi scal defi cit.
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